spontaneous preference for goodness in the presence of a
choice between good and evil. In order to make such goodness
possible at all for us, it was necessary that we should have a
limited amount oi freedom, that we should be placed in
conditions where good and evil are alike possible; where
the eternal distinction between the two can be discerned and
continually recognised, where the most bitter experiences
can teach us the malignant nature of all kinds of sin and
where blissful experience can teach us the benignity and
priceless value of all kinds of obedience to His moral law.
The evolution of moral good being then His supreme purpose
with man, even He, the Omnipotent All-in-All, has to leave
open the door to'what is called sin, the greatest of evils, seeing
that He endowed man the sublimest of gifts, the gift of free
will.
From a careful scrutiny of the teachings of theUpanishads,
I am led to infer that the sages do not seem to recognise the
existence of evil or sin as an independent element in God's
moral economy, as one having a substance of its own, but
seem to regard it only as something which is not natural but
unnatural, not primary and original but secondary and

derivative, as something which is the defect, excess, corruption or perversion of that which has substance, even as darkness is nothing but the disappearance of light. In other words, evil or sin consists in living in opposition to the law of moral faithfulness which our sense is obliged to admit, if not to follow. There is in us the law of animal life, the law of worldly social life, and the law of spiritual life, rising one above another,—oftentimes, the higher merging in the lower, sometimes, the lower merging in the higher. There is no necessary antagonism in them; the antagonism is our own making. We make it when we wilfully violate the higher for the sake of gratifying the lower. This is sin ; and we are its authors and not God. It is the result of